



Princeton University

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Founded in 1930, the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University is a major international center of advanced training and research in public and international affairs. The Woodrow Wilson School is an institution with the energy and strength to tackle the most serious issues of the present day, and the vision and experience to prepare the leaders who will shape the public policies of the future.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Nit nitay garabam. No person is an island.

The following report is the final product of a graduate policy workshop entitled "Power Africa and U.S. Stakeholder Engagement in Senegal" at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Our analysis would not have been possible without the generosity and support of the Woodrow Wilson School. Special thanks go to the school's Graduate Program Office, in particular, Jeffrey Oakman and Joanne Krzywulak for providing logistical support for research travel to Dakar, Senegal. We are greatly indebted to our policy workshop leader Laura Taylor-Kale, not only for her guidance, insights, and leadership, but also for her commitment to facilitating a pleasant learning experience for us all.

We would like to acknowledge our workshop client, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), specifically, the resident *Power Africa* Team Lead, Cheryl Voisard, for availing us the opportunity to contribute to its work in Senegal's emerging energy sector and for coordinating our interviews and site visits. At the U.S. Embassy in Dakar, we thank first and foremost, Ambassador Tulinabo Mushingi, as well as Jonathan Scott, James Garry, Souley Wade, and Amadou Lamine Ndour for their candor and invaluable insights. We thank also Subha Nagarajan at OPIC and André Larocque, Senegal's *Power Africa* Transactions and Reforms Program (PATRP) transaction advisor.

We are grateful to Hon. Mansour Kane, Senegal's Minister of Energy, and Mamadou Fall Kane for inviting us to share in the country's excitement about its energy sector prospects, and for helping us ground our analysis in the relevant national development context. Representatives from APIX and the Planning and Studies division of the Government of Senegal also receive our thanks.

We appreciate the input and advice provided by Faheen Allibhoy and Cheick-Oumar Sylla at IFC, Pauline Poisson at AFD, Manuel Berlengiero at the World Bank, Mimi Alemayehou at Black Rhino, and Julian Horn and Tamaro Kane at Lekela.

Additionally, we would like to acknowledge each of our guest speakers and panelists for being so generous with their time and for being excellent thought partners on this project: Kyeh Kim (MCC), Mary Beth Goodman (fmr. NSC), Nancy Rivera (OPIC), Nilmini Rubin (Tetra Tech, fmr. House Committee on Foreign Affairs), Chinesom Ejiasa (Africa Integras, fmr. OPIC), Uduak Essien (EXIM), Lisa Coppe (USTDA), Aysha House (USAID, fmr. ADF), and Jeffrey Krilla (Kosmos Energy).

Finally, to Jules Tall and our friends at the Baobab Center, for their constant encouragement throughout our time in Dakar, we say jërëjëf.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	3
ACRONYMS	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	## ARY ## 6
CONTEXT	8
Policy Workshop: Power Africa and U.S. Stakeholder Engagement in Senegal	8
The Power Africa Initiative	9
The Energy Sector in Senegal	9
Problem Description	11
DIAGNOSIS	11
Existing Power Africa Coordination in Senegal	12
Defining Challenges to Power Africa Coordination	15
The Costs of Lack of Coordination.	16
RECOMMENDATIONS	18
Recommendation #1: Enhance Organizational Function	18
Recommendation #2: Improve Internal and Leverage External Communication	24
Recommendation #3: Create a High-Level Energy Strategy Committee	27
CONCLUSION	31
ANNEXES	32
Annex I: Matrix of Recommendations	32
Annex II: USG Stakeholder and Partner Descriptions	34
Annex III: Additional Recommendations	39
Annex IV: About the Authors	41
RIRI IOGDADHV	44

ACRONYMS

ADF African Development Foundation

AFD Agence Française de Développement

AfDB African Development Bank

APIX Promotion des Investissements et Grands Travaux

ASER Agence Sénégalaise d'Électrification Rurale

COS-PETROGRAZ Senegal Strategic Orientation Committee of Oil and Gas

CSRE Commission de Régulation du Secteur de d'Electricité

DCM Deputy Chief of Mission

DFI Development Finance Institution

EXIM Export-Import Bank of the United States

FSO Foreign Service Officer

GoSN Government of Senegal

IFC International Finance Corporation

IPPs Independent Power Producers

LES Locally Employed Staff

MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation

MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

NSC National Security Council

OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation

PATRP Power Africa Transactions and Reforms Program

SENELEC Société National d'Éléctricité du Sénégal

TDY Temporary Duty Assignment

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USG United States Government

USTDA United States Trade and Development Agency

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Power Africa has the potential to transform the energy sector in sub-Saharan Africa, and specifically in Senegal, to better the lives of its citizens. In the Senegalese context, the stakes are high and the task is urgent: the country is ambitiously aiming to increase electricity access from about 55 percent today to universal access in 2025. The U.S. government's central challenge to fully supporting the Government of Senegal's energy goals and contributing to the broader Power Africa initiative is the lack of effective, institutionalized coordination between and within U.S. government agencies involved in Power Africa Senegal.

Tangibly, this manifests in missed opportunities for internal collaboration, miscommunication, duplication of efforts, and a failure to optimize activities. Further, the lack of institutionalized coordination prevents the U.S. government from both effectively communicating its goals for *Power Africa* and presenting a unified message to the Senegalese government, private sector entities, and multilateral and donor agencies.

The following report provides recommendations for improving and institutionalizing coordination among U.S. government agencies engaged in the *Power Africa* initiative in Senegal. These recommendations fall under three broad categories: 1) enhancing organization, 2) improving communications, and 3) creating a High-Level Energy Strategy Committee.

Each category is described below:

- I. Enhance Organizational Function: Working within the constraints of the current organizational structure of *Power Africa*, several proactive steps would enhance organizational function and improve overall coordination. First, *Power Africa* coordination should be included in the work requirements of all relevant U.S. officers working on the initiative in Senegal to incentivize coordination. The role of the *Power Africa* Team Lead in Senegal should be enhanced to better facilitate information sharing across agencies. Further, to improve institutional memory and better support the Team Lead, a Senegalese Locally Employed Staff (LES) should be hired whose primary assignment would be to support the *Power Africa* portfolio in Senegal. Finally, stakeholders such as OPIC, Treasury, and the Office of the *Power Africa* Coordinator in D.C. should be better integrated into *Power Africa* activities.
- II. Improve Internal and Leverage External Communication: Improving internal and leveraging external communication has the potential to mobilize and enhance *Power Africa* coordination efforts. To improve internal communication regarding *Power Africa*'s objectives in Senegal, the *Power Africa* Team Lead should prepare and disseminate an internal newsletter highlighting agencies' *Power Africa*-related activities. Furthermore,

^{1 &}quot;Power Africa in Senegal." U.S. Agency for International Development. 24 Feb. 2017. https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/senegal.

the *Power Africa* Team Lead should leverage external communication to mobilize internal coordination on *Power Africa*. Namely, the Ambassador's participation in *Power Africa*-related public activities, as well as efforts to gather private sector feedback, can be leveraged to increase coordination.

III. Create a High-Level Energy Strategy Committee: To underscore the importance and urgency of institutionalizing coordination, the U.S. Ambassador to Senegal should create a High-Level Energy Strategy Committee to facilitate coordination among U.S. Government (USG) agencies working on energy policy in Senegal. The Committee should incorporate and catalyze improvements in organizational function and internal and external communication, building on the two previous recommendations. The High-Level Energy Strategy Committee should serve as a convening mechanism to strategize ways to better coordinate among U.S. government actors in-country and facilitate energy policy implementation.

Importantly, these recommendations consider the views of a wide range of actors in the U.S. government and Government of Senegal, in the private sector, in multilateral institutions and the donor community. Each of these perspectives are key to understanding both current effectiveness of the initiative and needed improvements. Though this research was restricted by limited time, efforts to engage the multitude of perspectives involved in *Power Africa* Senegal contribute to the robustness of the recommendations.

Implementing each recommendation listed above will require buy-in from U.S. government *Power Africa* stakeholders in Senegal. Some recommendations, including the High-Level Energy Strategy Committee and the regular newsletter, are new activities that may take considerable time and effort to bring to fruition. Others, such as hiring a Senegalese LES, will require allocation of resources. However, these recommendations, taken together, demonstrate that it is possible to improve coordination across U.S. government agencies involved in *Power Africa* Senegal and eliminate many of the challenges identified during an extensive research process. With the right combination of political will and commitment by all stakeholders, it is within every U.S. government representative's reach to address existing shortcomings in coordination of *Power Africa* and better support the Government of Senegal's ambitious goals.

CONTEXT

Policy Workshop: Power Africa and U.S. Stakeholder Engagement in Senegal

This report is the culmination of a semester-long policy workshop for Master of Public Affairs candidates at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs in the fall of 2017. The policy workshop, under the leadership and counsel of Laura Taylor-Kale, found its genesis at the request of its client: Cheryl Voisard, the *Power Africa* Team Lead at the USAID Mission in Dakar, Senegal. The workshop was designed for 11 graduate students to assist the client in the development of a plan for improved policy analysis and coordination of *Power Africa* Senegal.

The client identified that while each USG agency involved in the power sector in Senegal has specific comparative advantages and possesses complementary tools, collectively they do not always work together as partners and thus do not learn critical lessons nor gain significant insight from each other. Therein, internal USG coordination was identified as a major challenge as responsibilities are not always neatly divided within or between agencies. The client expressed the need to leverage each agency's resources and reduce inefficiencies, particularly in a time of budget cuts. In this context, the question of enhanced coordination becomes imperative to improve policy and outcomes while simultaneously reducing costs.

In light of these concerns, the student team was originally tasked with assisting USAID in

creating a USG steering committee to help coordinate all USG energy stakeholders in Senegal. To assess the viability of this prospect as well as develop additional recommendations, the team researched the USG agencies involved in *Power Africa* Senegal, and likewise multilateral institutions, donors, private sector entities, and other key perspectives. This process began with a series of meetings—at Princeton University and in Washington D.C. prior to travel to Dakar—with representatives from MCC, OPIC, USTDA, EXIM, USAID, Tetra Tech, and Kosmos Energy, as well as former staff of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, NSC, ADF and OPIC.

Following this initial round of background research and meetings, the team traveled to Dakar for eight days to gain a more comprehensive understanding of Power Africa Senegal. In Dakar, the team held meetings with a broader range of USG, donor, and private entities including representatives from Department of State, MCC, OPIC, Tetra Tech, MIGA, IFC, AFD, Black Rhino, and Contour Global, as well as Government of Senegal agencies including the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Commission de Régulation du Secteur de d'Electricité (CSRE), Agence Sénégalaise d'Électrification Rurale (ASER), APIX, SENELEC, and the Deputy Permanent Secretary of Strategic Orientation Committee of Oil and Gas (COZ-PETROGAZ) . Further meetings were held with the Power Africa Coordinator's Office in Washington, D.C., the World Bank, and Lekela at Princeton University. Each interaction assisted the team in coming to a consensus regarding the recommendations outlined in this report.

The Power Africa Initiative

Launched in 2013, *Power Africa* is a U.S. government initiative with the ambitious goal of increasing energy access to 600 million people across the sub-Saharan Africa region by providing 30,000 megawatts (MW) of new electric generation and 60 million direct connections.² The United States launched this initiative in response to a 2011 International Energy Agency report, which found that sub-Saharan Africa will require more than \$300 billion in investment to achieve universal electricity access by 2030. An investment of this magnitude would require increased private sector involvement and enhanced donor coordination.³

As codified in the bipartisan 2015 Electrify Africa Act, Power Africa leverages the resources of 12 U.S. government agencies to provide technical and financial assistance for energy projects throughout the sub-continent in partnership with the private sector. These agencies include: the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Export-Import Bank (EXIM), the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), the Department of State, Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, U.S. African Development Foundation (ADF), and Army Corp. of Engineers.4 Charged with coordinating the initiative, USAID houses the Power Africa Coordinator's Office as well as Team Leads for each participating country.

The *Power Africa* initiative was broadly viewed as timely and welcomed by the Senegalese government which, a year later in 2014, launched a new development and economic plan—*Plan for an Emergent Senegal (PSE)*—prioritizing energy generation and access. Despite Senegal's absence from the inaugural list of *Power Africa* pilot countries, the Senegalese government advocated to join the initiative and was ultimately successful. The U.S. government began to implement *Power Africa* Senegal in 2015.

The Energy Sector in Senegal

Senegal has one of the highest electrification rates in sub-Saharan Africa at 55 percent nationwide. However, electricity tariffs are still higher than the regional average and rural electrification remains low at 28 percent as of February 2017.5 The lack of energy infrastructure has contributed to long-term economic underperformance and remains a challenge even with current improvements in economic growth. Currently, soaring electricity costs discourage private investment, which has cascading, detrimental effects for business ownership, employment, and citizens' quality of life. Senegal's energy demand is expected to increase rapidly as it works to achieve middle-income status by 2035. Without an adequate and reliable supply of electricity to fuel economic growth and encourage foreign direct investment, reaching this goal will be challenging.⁶ As such, the Government of Senegal has ambitious plans to transform its

^{2 &}quot;Power Africa Roadmap 2017." U.S. Agency for International Development. https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/roadmap.

³ Energy For All: Financing Access for the Poor | International Energy Agency, 2011. http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2011/weo2011_energy_for_all.pdf.

⁴ For a list of U.S Government Agencies in *Power Africa*, see: "U.S. Government Agencies - Power Africa." United States Agency for International Development. 24 February 17. https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/usgovernmentagencies.

^{5 &}quot;Power Africa in Senegal." U.S. Agency for International Development. February 24, 2017. https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/senegal.

⁶ Ibid.



Energy is the number one issue for economic development [in Senegal]. It is important for attracting investment, and a failure to solve the energy problem will delay development.

Mamadou Fall Kane

Deputy Permanent Secretary, Strategic Orientation Committee of Oil and Gas

energy sector and achieve universal electricity access by 2025.7

Against this backdrop, the Government of Senegal is taking advantage of recent oil and gas discoveries that have the potential to remarkably transform Senegal's economy. Within the past three years, Cairn Energy twice discovered oil and Kosmos Energy discovered three natural gas sites, boosting the hope of increased energy access in the country. In response, President Macky Sall implemented a series of structural and institutional reforms to improve the management of the oil and gas industry. The Ministry of Energy and Development of Renewable Energy was replaced by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, signaling the increased importance of the newfound oil resources. In addition, the Strategic Orientation Committee of Oil and Gas (COZ-PETROGAZ) was established to provide strategic guidance and oversee policies regarding hydrocarbon development. This committee is currently embedded within the Office of the President, further signaling the importance of energy at the highest levels of Senegalese government.

Senegal has also made progress in renewable energy generation, particularly in solar and wind. The first competitive tender for solar photovoltaic projects was launched in 2016 under the World Bank's "Scaling Solar" initiative. Since then, two major solar projects totaling 50MW have been completed: the 20MW

Bukhol and the 30MW Ten Merina solar plants. These two projects were connected to the grid in early 2017. Furthermore, the 158MW Taiba N'Diaye wind project is under development and expected to be operational by 2020. In addition to collaboration with the World Bank and other partners, USG agencies participating in Power Africa have played a significant role in bringing these projects to fruition.

Indeed, Senegal's energy sector currently constitutes a dynamic opportunity for cooperation with USG agencies. The U.S. government is already held in high regard for its emphasis on facilitating private sector investment. Utilizing the resources of USG agencies under the Power Africa umbrella, the United States has increasingly financed and provided technical assistance to Senegal's vibrant energy sector alongside other donor, project development, and finance partners. Senegal's economic potential, political stability, and influence in West Africa has long made it a desired partner for the United States.8 Senegal's growing energy needs and recent energy sector developments present an exciting opportunity for further collaboration with both the U.S. government and the U.S. private sector.

[&]quot;Senegal." Lighting Africa. https://www.lightingafrica.org/country/senegal/.

Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Senegal | U.S. Department of State, June 30, 2017. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ ei/bgn/2862.htm.

DIAGNOSIS

Problem Description

Our client identified internal USG coordination as a major challenge to *Power Africa* as responsibilities are not always neatly divided within or between agencies. The client expressed the need to leverage each agency's abilities and resources and reduce inefficiencies, particularly in a time of budget cuts. In this context, the question of collaboration becomes imperative to improve policy and outcomes while simultaneously reducing costs.

Further research revealed that a primary challenge to improving upon the existing, informal coordination of Power Africa Senegal is that USAID currently lacks the institutional authority to effectively enforce coordination without greater involvement from higher levels of the U.S. government (such as the National Security Council). Moreover, executing the formal role of coordinating the initiative requires gathering information from all agencies, a particularly difficult task given that information sharing costs valuable time and resources. In some cases, USAID can offer technical expertise, but this does not always incentivize all agencies to cooperate. As our client noted, the main consequence is that coordination is personality-driven and occurs on an individual rather than institutionalized basis. These relationships between officers of the agencies currently facilitate the existing interagency collaboration, but Power Africa cannot continue to rely on them due to regular U.S. staff turnover.9

As a result, Power Africa's potential impact in Senegal's dynamic energy sector has been limited. Lack of coordination has hampered communication and collaboration, leading to duplication of efforts, missed strategic opportunities, project delays, and failure to optimize as each federal agency struggles to hold on to what it considers its responsibility and core mission. More broadly, there is an absence of unified messaging with external partners, leading to confusion surrounding what constitutes "Power Africa," the initiative's goals within Senegal, and the opportunities for partnership. The following sections describe existing coordination within Power Africa Senegal, identify the primary challenges, and elaborate on the costs resulting from lack of coordination.



Lack of coordination has hampered communication and collaboration, leading to duplication of efforts, missed strategic opportunities, project delays, and failure to optimize.

⁹ The standard length of an overseas tour for Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) is 24 months. See: "ADS Chapter 436: Foreign Service Assignments and Tours of Duty." United States Agency for International Development. December 22, 2016. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1877/436.pdf.

Existing Power Africa Coordination in Senegal

Collaboration Overview

Based on an extensive interview process, Figure 1 illustrates existing relationships between U.S. government agencies and external partners. The relationships shown here are not exhaustive, but serve to illustrate the need for improved coordination and potential for a more streamlined approach. A complete description of each of the actors in the diagram can be found in Annex II: USG Stakeholder and Partner Descriptions.


Of the 12 U.S. government agencies involved in the *Power Africa* initiative, USAID, MCC, OPIC, USTDA, and the Department of State (State) have played the largest roles in Senegal's energy sector to date. Each agency brings several strengths to the initiative in Senegal.

The USAID *Power Africa* Team Lead has the formal role of coordinating the initiative in-country. The agency also provides technical assistance, capacity building, and transaction support services to the Government of Senegal (GoSN) and private sector through their contract with Tetra Tech. These services are designed to prioritize, coordinate, and expedite the implementation of power projects." The *Power Africa* Coordinator's Office in Washington, D.C. and Pretoria works with the *Power Africa* Team Lead in-country, and plays a role in coordinating the U.S. interagency at a higher level in Washington, D.C.

MCC is in the process of signing a significant energy sector compact with the GoSN. Given that MCC compacts range in the hundreds of millions of dollars, the proposed compact will be the largest U.S financial commitment to the Senegalese energy sector to date.¹¹ In addition to


Figure 1: Power Africa Senegal Stakeholder Analysis

U.S. GOVERNMENT



^{10 &}quot;How We Work." U.S. Agency for International Development. December 9, 2016. https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/howwework.

¹¹ MCC's first compact with Senegal totaled \$5.4 million USD, but did not focus on energy.



the sizeable investment, MCC brings a cadre of technical experts from the United States to the table and has increased standing with the Government of Senegal as a result. The proposed compact also provides an important focal point for discussions between the USG and GoSN

Ultimately, Power Africa coordination should promote the mobilization of capital for energy investment. Development finance institutions (DFIs) like the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and OPIC dominate as the primary sources of capital for energy investments on the continent. OPIC is the DFI of the U.S. government. With an officer based in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire OPIC operates quite independently of the other USG agencies, but it receives some "bankable" projects prepared by USTDA, relies on State for intermediating with the Government of Senegal, and depends upon regulatory bodies such as the Central Bank of West African States for an investment climate suitable for project finance. More specifically, OPIC has provided financial support to the Cap des Biches thermal power plant, the Senergy 1 and Ten Merina Ndakhar solar PV farms, and the Taiba N'Diaye wind plant.

The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), operating primarily out of Washington, D.C., prepares bankable projects through feasibility studies, technical assistance, piloting of U.S. technology and equipment overseas, and project preparation assistance. USTDA also conducts reverse trade missions.

Finally, the Department of State, through the Economics Section of the U.S. Embassy in Dakar, facilitates investment by U.S. businesses in the energy sector and fosters high-level contacts within the Government of Senegal. State also supports the U.S. Ambassador, the highest-ranking U.S. official in Senegal.

Collaboration Gaps

Where coordination among actors is currently

strong, institutional missions and incentives are often aligned. Where coordination is weaker or nonexistent, it is often because only one, or none, of the actors has incentive to coordinate with the other. Several internal gaps in coordination exist and result in external coordination gaps.

For example, the Department of Treasury represents the United States at the African Development Bank and World Bank, and has one staff member embedded in the Central Bank of Western African States, the central bank for Senegal and many neighboring countries. However, though Treasury offers countries technical assistance on infrastructure financing and regulatory frameworks, Treasury has yet to directly engage on a country basis with *Power Africa* Senegal. This is a missed opportunity for collaboration on the initiative.

Outside the U.S. government, coordination with the private sector is critical to the success of Power Africa. From an infrastructure financing perspective, while there have been some successful private capital energy deals through funds like Black Rhino, private commercial capital is still not a major player due to the level of risk, upfront investment, and patience required for energy investments. However, the role of private companies (such as British Petroleum) will grow in importance in coming years and Power Africa can serve as a point of contact, information, technical expertise, and partnerships for U.S. businesses looking to establish themselves in Senegal's energy sector. The U.S. government will need to strengthen its internal coordination and close collaboration gaps in order to coordinate effectively and efficiently with the private sector.

Similarly, enhanced internal USG coordination is necessary for the USG to effectively coordinate with the broader donor community. The saturation of donors in Senegal requires

both internal USG and external coordination to ensure projects are complementary. A donor coordination mechanism already exists amongst the donors, in which USAID and MCC currently represent the USG. However, USAID and MCC's ability to represent the whole of USG energy interests in Senegal and use this mechanism as a way of advancing *Power Africa* will depend on whether the USG agencies coordinate effectively on the initiative.

Defining Challenges to Power Africa Coordination

Despite these successes, the gap between electrification rates in Senegal's urban and rural communities persists and the energy sector remains complex and unpredictable. The United States remains a committed partner, but while each USG agency involved in the power sector in Senegal has specific comparative advantages and possesses complementary tools, as outlined above, the client identified that collectively they do not always work together as partners and thus do not learn critical lessons nor gain significant insight from each other. As a result, coordination in Senegal tends to be personality-driven and there are no strong systems in place to institutionalize coordination.

While USAID's formal role of Power Africa coordination comes with the benefit of a specific budget, it also comes with the burden of Power Africa appearing exclusively as a USAID program, allowing other agencies to deprioritize ownership and responsibility for the initiative. The Power Africa Team Lead's limited authority within the U.S. Embassy framework, as well as limited funding, weakens USAID's ability to effectively coordinate the initiative. Moreover, the considerable business expertise in the Economics section of the U.S. Embassy, compared to that of the USAID mission, further undercuts USAID's ability to effectively coordinate the Power Africa initiative,

particularly with the private sector.

This central challenge of *Power Africa* Senegal—USAID's lack of institutional authority to coordinate the initiative and the resulting personality-driven dynamic—can be disaggregated into organizational and communication challenges.

Organizational Challenges emerge when the responsibilities of U.S. government agencies are not clearly delineated between or within agencies. Each USG entity involved in the power sector in Senegal has specific comparative advantages and brings complementary tools to the table; however, collectively they do not always work together as partners under the *Power Africa* umbrella due to misaligned incentives or institutional structures.

Communication Challenges emerge when there is no systematic way of knowledge-sharing across different agencies, creating both internal and external communication challenges. Internally, agency-specific knowledge management systems make regular knowledge sharing difficult. Interagency communication often takes place on an ad-hoc basis. Moreover, despite its many successes, coordination within Power Africa remains a major challenge as multiple U.S. government agencies work in parallel with the Senegalese government and other external agencies on energy-related policy. For external partners, the lack of a unified message among U.S. government agencies results in inefficient collaboration and confusion surrounding what constitutes "Power Africa."

The Costs of Lack of Coordination

The organizational and communication challenges in *Power Africa* coordination identified above necessarily have costs for the Senegalese energy sector. A detailed list of these costs follows:

Duplication of Efforts

Lack of coordination within Power Africa Senegal leads to redundancy. This means two given agencies will unnecessarily spend double the effort, resources, and time to produce the same item twice, when collaboration would have been more efficient. For example, U.S. government agencies in Senegal spend considerable time conducting due diligence, which includes feasibility or demand studies, prior to investing in an energy project. Despite the fact that USAID has several studies on energy demand in Senegal, some agencies do not regularly utilize them. As a result, agencies may end up allocating their own resources to conducting separate demand studies on the same topic. Duplication may also entail separate efforts to communicate and work with the Government of Senegal on similar projects and policy reforms.

Missed Strategic Opportunities

Lack of institutionalized coordination causes U.S. government agencies to miss strategic opportunities to leverage other agencies' efforts, save their valuable resources, and ultimately strengthen U.S. involvement in Senegal's energy sector. For example, if USAID needs to communicate a sensitive message or privileged information pertaining to a specific energy project to the Minister of Energy, and another agency—such as the Department of State—has an existing appointment, USAID should be able to convey its message through State. Currently, such opportunities are often missed. Therefore, improving coordination may lead to deeper and longer-term

partnerships across USG agencies with regards to energy policy. This will in turn signal that the agencies have a unified goal in Senegal, providing them greater credibility and more opportunities to build strategic relationships with the Senegalese government.

Project Delays

Lack of coordination leads to delays in projects. When agencies contributing to the Power Africa effort do not coordinate with each other on the same project, this leads to inefficiencies in the system. If USAID needs OPIC's support to start a project, for example, and is unable to begin because of lack of institutionalized coordination, both USAID and OPIC have to keep staff and consultants on the payroll for a longer time than would otherwise be necessary. Therefore, delays in projects cost U.S. government agencies considerable financial resources over time. The cost of project delays to the Government of Senegal and local stakeholders is access to affordable electricity for business and household activities.

Failure to Capitalize on Comparative Advantages

Lack of coordination hinders each U.S. government agency from capitalizing on its comparative advantage within *Power Africa*. For instance, USAID has research expertise while the Department of State has invaluable access and connections to Senegal's Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, as well as others. Lack of coordination prevents these agencies from drawing on the unique strengths of their counterparts and working as a cohesive unit.

Given these challenges and the resulting costs of lack of coordination, a significant opportunity exists to leverage the collective strength of the U.S. government to improve *Power Africa* coordination efforts and better support the Senegalese energy sector. Indeed, many internal *Power Africa* Senegal stakeholders

and leaders—including the U.S. Ambassador to Senegal—have expressed a clear interest in improving coordination, and for some, better institutionalizing it. And, there already has been some progress in this domain; USG representatives noted the improved communication channels with the *Power Africa* Lead in Senegal. At the same time, those same representatives have highlighted a need for greater clarity on each agency's role within *Power Africa*.

However, just as each agency within *Power Africa* has unique mission statements, interests, and resources, each has different ideas about how best to improve and/or institutionalize coordination. For some agencies, institutionalized coordination would take the form of a formalized committee to guide *Power Africa* implementation. For others, a different coordination system might be more suitable, while some do not see the need for more institutionalized coordination at all. Thus, despite most agencies experiencing a single problem—lack of coordination—how this problem affects each agency varies and influences how each chooses to address it.

The following section outlines a comprehensive set of recommendations to address these organizational and communication challenges. Taken together, these recommendations can improve coordination of *Power Africa* Senegal and reduce the incidence of the costs outlined above.



A significant opportunity exists to leverage the collective strength of the USG to improve Power Africa coordination efforts and better support the Senegalese energy sector.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are designed to remedy the complex coordination challenges among USG agencies in *Power Africa* Senegal and minimize the associated costs. They fall under three categories: 1) enhancing organization, 2) improving internal and leveraging external communications, and 3) creating a High-Level Energy Strategy committee. The High-Level Energy Strategy Committee is designed to reinforce the first two recommendations, ensuring coordination occurs regularly in an institutionalized setting and with buy-in from all relevant *Power Africa* stakeholders. Each set of recommendations is described in detail below. If implemented, these targeted recommendations can help the U.S. Government act as an even more effective partner for the Government of Senegal as it aims for universal electricity access by 2025.

#1: Enhance Organizational Function

- Include Power Africa coordination in work requirements for all relevant USG officers in Senegal
- Enhance the role of *Power*Africa Team Lead in Senegal
- Hire a Senegalese Power Africa Locally Employed Staff (LES)
- Integrate other agencies

#2: Improve Internal and Leverage External Communication

- Improve internal communication: send bi-weekly emails and monthly newsletters to enhance interagency information sharing
- Leverage external communication: capitalize on Ambassadorial events and private sector feedback to mobilize internal USG coordination

#3: Create a High-Level Energy Strategy Committee



RECOMMENDATION # 1: ENHANCE ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTION

Working within the constraints of the current organizational structure of *Power Africa*, several proactive steps would enhance organizational function and improve overall coordination on the initiative. First, *Power Africa* coordination should be included in the work requirements of all relevant U.S. officers in Senegal to incentivize coordination. The role

of the *Power Africa* Team Lead in Senegal should be enhanced to better facilitate information sharing across agencies. Further, to improve institutional memory and better support the Team Lead, a Senegalese Locally Employed Staff (LES) should be hired whose primary assignment would be to support the *Power Africa* portfolio in Senegal over an

extended time period. Finally, stakeholders such as OPIC, Treasury, and the Coordinator's Office should be better integrated into *Power Africa* activities than at present. Each of these items is discussed in detail below.

A. Include *Power Africa*Coordination in Work Requirements for All Relevant USG Officers in Senegal

As identified in the diagnosis section, an overall lack of incentive to coordinate—particularly in the current absence of sustained NSC involvement in the initiative—is a key impediment to effective and efficient coordination within Power Africa Senegal. Though relevant USG officers in Senegal may desire to coordinate more effectively, the various hierarchies and competing demands of their agencies sometimes overshadow Power Africa coordination. Including *Power Africa* coordination as a work requirement for all relevant officers who work on energy-related issues in Senegal would license officers to focus their efforts on the issue. Moreover, officers less inclined to coordinate under the present structure would be incentivized to do so as work requirements are tied to performance evaluations.

Including Power Africa coordination in the work requirements of USG officers would require the endorsement of the U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) to lobby the various agencies to make this change for their respective officers. However, for USG officers under the Ambassador and DCM's chain of command, the task would be much simpler and more quickly implemented.

In particular, *Power Africa* Senegal would benefit from increased coordination between the Economics Section (ECON) of the U.S. Embassy and the *Power Africa* Team Lead in the USAID Mission. Whereas the technical expertise of the Tetra Tech advisors within the *Power Africa* Transactions and Reforms

Program (PATRP) are one of the key strengths USAID brings to the table, ECON officers foster high-level contacts within the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the President's office, and elsewhere in-country. This knowledge of in-country dynamics is critical to connecting the private sector to Senegalese and U.S. government officials to whom they otherwise would not have access. Enhanced coordination and information sharing between ECON and the Power Africa Team Lead would increase synergies between general U.S. energy and economic policy and the Power Africa initiative, as well as reduce redundant efforts or meetings undertaken by the two offices. Two key ways to operationalize this would be:

- 1. Work Requirements: Include coordinating with the *Power Africa* Team Lead on all energy-related issues to the work requirements of ECON officers, and vice versa, tying satisfactory performance evaluations to the level of coordination; and
- **2. Travel Preparation:** Require that all U.S. government energy-related travel to Senegal be coordinated jointly by the *Power Africa* Team Lead and ECON.

Both actions would incentivize increased coordination between the two offices and would have positive spillovers to other agencies working on energy-related policy in Senegal.



Each recommendation will require buy-in from U.S. government Power Africa stakeholders in Senegal to be fully realized.

B. Enhance the Role of *Power* Africa Team Lead in Senegal

As mentioned above, despite its formal role as coordinator of Power Africa, USAID does not have enough "assets" to enforce coordination. The broader institutional challenge of coordination is played out on the ground in Senegal. In many cases, other actors do not currently have incentives to coordinate with USAID on Power Africa-related projects. A typical example is when the Power Africa Team Lead requests information from other agencies, but does not have any other resources to offer as a way to foster information exchange. Thus, from the perspective of other actors, providing information is perceived as a cost without benefits. This in turn introduces costs for Power Africa as a whole, leading to potential duplication and miscommunication.

Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the role of the *Power Africa* Team Lead so that the position can more effectively and efficiently facilitate coordination. The following recommendations broadly take advantage of USAID's existing strengths and opportunities and focus on strengthening the position of the *Power Africa* Team Lead in Senegal should:

1. Design and Implement a Process of Onboarding Relevant USG Officers. In doing so, the Power Africa Team Lead establishes his/her position as the focal point for Power Africa coordination in-country. The process also ensures that all new officers working on energy-related issues in the country have the same basic understanding of the initiative, including the goals and function of the initiative, as well as its current state of development and potential evolution. Onboarding should also include a description of key stakeholders and their roles. An understanding of the

different roles of the multiple agencies participating in *Power Africa* will ease coordination challenges by minimizing the current gaps in knowledge about the initiative.

- 2. Increase Communication within Power Africa Senegal. Maintaining regular communication with USG officers will facilitate the sharing of information. More specifically, the Team Lead should send a monthly Power Africa newsletter and bi-weekly email to internal stakeholders. These two items are discussed in detail below (Recommendation 2-A).
- 3. Manage the Power Africa Transaction Tracking Tool (PATT) for Senegal. PATT is currently administered by the contracted transaction advisors and is used to follow the progress of the Power Africa related projects implemented across USG agencies. Managing the tracking tool will require significant time that would detract from the Team Lead's important duties of building relationships between interagency actors involved in Power Africa coordination, as well as between those actors, the Government of Senegal and the private sector. Therefore, the tracking tool might be better suited to a dedicated Senegalese Power Africa Locally Employed Staff (LES) member who reports to the Power Africa Team Lead in Senegal. The recommendation of hiring of a Senegalese Power Africa LES is discussed in detail below (Recommendation 1-C).
- 4. Better Advertise Transaction Advisors. For many stakeholders in the Senegalese energy sector, the *Power Africa* transactions advisors constitute an important value-add for the initiative. Their technical expertise and close work with the

Senegalese government puts them in a strategic position to move energy projects forward. The *Power Africa* Team Lead should better advertise the transactions advisors as a key feature of USAID's contribution toward *Power Africa* and make clear how they can assist stakeholders, thus providing the Team Lead with another point of information sharing.

These four recommendations will enhance the Team Lead as the focal point of *Power Africa* coordination within Senegal, as well as empower the role as a curator of information. As such, these recommendations will endow the position with institutional assets to exercise effective coordination and make the initiative's efforts more efficient.

C. Hire a Senegalese *Power*Africa Locally Employed Staff (LES)

Hiring a Senegalese LES dedicated to working on *Power Africa* would greatly improve upon the initiative's existing organization and further enhance the *Power Africa* Team Lead's position. Specifically, hiring a Senegalese *Power Africa* LES would:

1. Increase Technical Knowledge and Expertise: The Power Africa Team Lead position in Senegal is filled by USAID Foreign Service Officers (FSOs)—generalists valued for their ability to engage meaningfully across a diverse portfolio of development challenges. By contrast, a Senegalese Power Africa LES should be hired based on his/her technical knowledge and expertise in the energy sector to complement the Team Lead. The Power Africa LES should have outstanding energy sector expertise and understand the history and efficacy of power sector reform.

2. Enhance Access to Local Networks:

LES often have extensive relevant personal and professional networks within government, private sector, and civil society—and can use them to drive meaningful and successful engagement and partnerships. They also understand local political and social contexts, as well as the ways they may impact power sector policy, governance, and reform. A Senegalese *Power Africa* LES could help ensure the Team approaches energy sector issues in the most effective way possible.

- 3. Create Institutional Memory: FSOs rotate positions every few years. Indeed, the current *Power Africa* Team Lead will leave Senegal within the next year. In contrast, LES often retain their positions for much longer and can therefore help ensure continuity and the retention of institutional knowledge over the medium-to-long term. A Senegalese *Power Africa* LES could help ease the transition between *Power Africa* Team Leads
- 4. Increase Team Capacity: Interagency coordination is a monumental task and a Senegalese *Power Africa* LES working alongside the Team Lead could help streamline the process. Concretely, the *Power Africa* LES could assume management of the *Power Africa* Transactions Tool (PATT) discussed above.

D. Integrate Other Agencies

D-1. Connect OPIC

OPIC must be better integrated into the broader *Power Africa* effort in Senegal. As the U.S. Government's development finance institution, the agency brings considerable financial resources and expertise on project finance, critical to the development of the energy sector. The mandate and operations of OPIC—which entails assisting U.S. businesses

in their emerging market investments through financial services—differ considerably from those of other agencies in Senegal, so more coordination may not always be optimal. However, OPIC has much to gain from better cooperation, such as providing input on comprehensive studies and coordinating on policy reforms that will enable its own investments. Moreover, OPIC's integration will reduce chances for missed opportunities in the *Power Africa* initiative, such as new energy projects, and help create unified messaging for the U.S. government.

The USAID Mission should build a better relationship with OPIC, particularly its West Africa office, while managing expectations about the scope of potential involvement. The Power Africa Team Lead should communicate clearly the information required for coordination. At the same time, the Power Africa Team Lead must make greater efforts to increase understanding of OPIC's operations and institutional culture among other USG Power Africa stakeholders. As a development finance institution, OPIC's operations are significantly different from those of other USG agencies.

OPIC officers, meanwhile, should communicate their needs as related to energy project finance. Information sharing is limited by partner and client confidentiality requirements, but regular communication would allow for studies better designed for their audience, coordinated efforts to achieve reforms improving the project finance environment, and enhanced coordination by the *Power Africa* Team Lead. Better understanding of the agency's work in project finance and reasonable areas for collaboration could improve collaboration with OPIC as a whole and lead to greater synergies among U.S. energy sector activities in Senegal.

D-2. Include Treasury in Coordination Efforts

Power Africa Senegal should build a relationship with Department of Treasury staff to better understand the policy environment and create potential avenues for technical assistance. Treasury adds value in a number of ways:

- 1. Improved Coordination with Multilaterals: Treasury can improve coordination between Power Africa and the World Bank and African Development Bank, in which U.S. involvement is overseen by staff in Treasury's Office of Multilateral Development Banks. Furthermore, Treasury staffs Executive Directors representing the United States at each of these institutions, providing an avenue to promote Senegalese energy development in their agendas.
- 2. Increased Potential for Technical Assistance: Treasury could provide energy-related technical assistance to Senegal, advising on power investments and frameworks. Additionally, Treasury has a staff member advising the Central Bank of West African States, creating influence over regulatory policy that affects project finance in Senegal.
- 3. Increased Expertise in Reforms and Investment Environment: Treasury has experience in advising governments on growth- and investment-friendly policies that would be of great benefit to the coordinating agencies in Power Africa. With the discovery of major gas reserves and the implementation of a new energy plan, it is an opportune moment for Treasury to advise on Senegal's economy.

Power Africa Senegal should therefore communicate with Treasury's Power Africa coordinator, Senegal lead, and staff in the Central Bank to discuss ways forward, and to include them in virtual meetings when sensible. Overall, inclusion of Treasury is in line with an emphasis on understanding the value added by all USG agencies, particularly those in D.C.

D-3. Embed D.C. *Power Africa* Officer for Senegal in U.S. Embassy Dakar for 3

A key aspect of *Power Africa* Senegal's organizational function is coordinating with the *Power Africa* Coordinator's Office in Washington, D.C. and Pretoria. In part due to distance, the existing coordination mechanism between agencies working on *Power Africa* and the Coordinator's Office is not being adequately leveraged to build effective working relationships.

Power Africa Senegal would benefit from greater coordination with the Coordinator's Office, first, because it maintains a "bird's eye view" of the resources U.S. government agencies bring to bear in Power Africa. Second, the Coordinator oversees resources set aside in USAID's budget to help agencies achieve their goals within *Power Africa*. These funds support OPIC deals, USTDA grants, and Department of State and Department of Commerce activities, among others. Lastly, the Power Africa Deputy Energy Office Director in Washington is already providing technical assistance to Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire and coordinating frequently with Tetra Tech transaction advisors. Each activity undertaken by the Coordinator's Office is necessary for streamlining Power Africa activities, thus better coordination with the country team has the potential to maximize the initiative's impact on the ground.

To improve coordination between the Coordinator's Office and energy-focused officers at the U.S. Embassy in Dakar, the Deputy Energy Officer from the Office of the Coordinator should conduct a three-month

temporary duty assignment (TDY) to the USAID Mission in Dakar. Embedding the Deputy Energy Officer in Dakar would allow him/her to bridge the divide between how coordination currently works in Senegal and in Washington, D.C., an insight not easily gained through remote means such as teleconferences or email. The proposed TDY would also strengthen relationships between key *Power Africa* staff in Senegal and Washington, D.C., as well as provide a better sense of which tasks fall under the purview of the *Power Africa* Team Lead at the USAID Mission or the Energy Office Deputy Director in Washington, D.C.

RECOMMENDATION #2: IMPROVE INTERNAL AND LEVERAGE EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION

Improving internal and leveraging external communication has the potential to mobilize and enhance Power Africa coordination efforts. To improve internal communication regarding Power Africa's objectives in Senegal, the Power Africa Team Lead should gather content for and disseminate a monthly internal newsletter and bi-weekly email highlighting agencies' Power Africa-related activities. Furthermore, the Power Africa Team Lead should leverage external communication to mobilize internal coordination on Power Africa. Namely, the Ambassador's participation in *Power Africa*-related public activities, as well as efforts to gather private sector feedback, can be leveraged to increase coordination on the initiative.

A. Improve Internal Communication: Send a Bi-Weekly Email and Monthly Newsletter to Enhance Interagency Information Sharing

Communication is central to collaboration, yet no periodic, comprehensive notification to all USG stakeholders in Senegal currently exists regarding *Power Africa*-related activities. While efforts such as the *Power Africa* Tracking Tool (PATT) are helpful, they are often compiled on an ad-hoc basis, leaving out critical information from organizations that choose to opt-out. This information deficit is a barrier to collaboration and coordination, as evidenced by the observed duplication of efforts and absence of unified, USG-wide messaging on energy efforts in Senegal.

The *Power Africa* Team Lead could greatly improve internal communication by collecting information for and disseminating the following: 1) a bi-weekly email with topline updates on power initiatives; and 2) a comprehensive monthly newsletter with detailed updates. Newsletter and email content should include:

- Live Projects: recent progress on ongoing projects;
- Challenges and Priorities: commentary on salient challenges and agency priorities in the reporting period;
- Energy Sector Developments: analysis of key developments in the domestic energy landscape;
- Forthcoming Developments: commentary on noteworthy developments on the horizon;
- Power Africa Spotlight: highlight success stories from agencies, personnel working on Power Africa, or donors and private sector partners.

These two channels offer a solution to the current internal communication deficit and align with USAID's designation as the chief coordinating body for *Power Africa*, while providing additional benefits. For the *Power Africa* Team Lead in particular, the newsletter and email provide a forum for interaction with energy-related officers on an ongoing and predictable (rather than ad-hoc) basis that could strengthen relationships with other agencies and improve the Team Lead's ability

to effectively and efficiently coordinate *Power Africa* efforts across agencies. More broadly, content generated through the newsletter will directly support the USAID Mission's contribution to the publication of the annual *Power Africa* Annual Reports. The newsletter itself would clearly demonstrate the unique contributions of USAID Senegal, increasing the team's visibility and value to the overall initiative

These communications would remain strictly internal to the USG; however, outward-facing variations, which would help promote the *Power Africa* brand, may be developed should administrative capacity permit. Dissemination of the email and newsletter should target USG agencies in Senegal, the *Power Africa* Coordinator's Office in Washington, D.C. and Pretoria, and other relevant players.

Underlying this recommendation are the following assumptions: (i) that information is currency, and; (ii) that agencies have strong incentives to highlight their contributions to Senegal's energy generation targets. Regarding the former, the newsletter provides value by increasing knowledge about the domestic energy landscape and related USG activities for all USG stakeholders, encouraging collaboration. On the latter, the dissemination of the newsletter—particularly if a wide range of stakeholders are included strengthens the incentives for stakeholder participation, given the implied opportunity for each agency to highlight its accomplishments. Additionally, stakeholders will need to communicate in advance to develop content related to common projects.

Admittedly, implementing this recommendation may require strengthening the administrative support for the *Power Africa* Team Lead in Senegal, such as hiring a Locally Engaged Staff to work exclusively on *Power Africa* (Recommendation 1-C).

B. Leverage External Communication to Mobilize Internal USG Coordination

B-1. Encourage and Leverage Ambassador Participation in *Power Africa* Senegal Efforts

As stated earlier, information is currency. As the highest representative of the United States in Senegal, the Ambassador's words and the information they convey carry the most weight. Therefore, encouraging the Ambassador to publicly promote *Power Africa*'s efforts in Senegal can enhance coordination and collaboration because the Ambassador's mention of, or participation in, *Power Africa* related activities 1) signals the importance of the initiative to both internal stakeholders and external partners; and 2) requires internal stakeholders to collaborate.

Therefore, the *Power Africa* Team Lead can improve coordination efforts by ensuring *Power Africa* is prioritized in the Ambassador's talking points—taking care to highlight diverse activities undertaken by the various USG agencies—and that those talking points are widely cleared and shared with the relevant internal stakeholders.

Elevating Power Africa to one of the Ambassador's key priorities in Senegal further reinforces the position of the Power Africa Team Lead (as described in Recommendation 1-B). Beyond coordinating talking points, the Power Africa Team Lead should leverage the Ambassador's interest in Power Africa to coordinate a new Senegal-specific tool kit for use in communicating the initiative with external audiences. The Power Africa Senegal Tool Kit should include a one-pager about Power Africa's current activities in-country, a set of unified talking points, and social media guidance to promote the initiative in English, French, and Wolof. The toolkit should be reviewed and updated as needed by the Power Africa Team Lead and disseminated

to the relevant officers and agencies prior to any major *Power Africa* related events. The process of creating such a tool kit will require increased internal communication and collaboration among the various USG stakeholders and can be further leveraged to increase regular coordination.

Implementing this strategy requires the buy-in of the Ambassador's office. Thus, the *Power Africa* Team Lead should take the initiative to communicate the vision for this strategy and ensure that appropriate steps are taken, such as: regularly briefing the Ambassador on *Power Africa* activities; suggesting *Power Africa* agenda items when energy-related meetings are scheduled on the Ambassador's calendar; and actively suggesting opportunities where the Ambassador can speak publicly about *Power Africa*.

B-2. Request and Leverage Private Sector Feedback Through a Biannual Survey

Private sector actors have expressed concern regarding incorporation of their feedback with respect to Power Africa and have identified a survey as a constructive vehicle to address this shortcoming. Developing a brief survey to be circulated twice a year to relevant private sector actors in Senegal (both U.S. entities and others) would offer critical insight into external perceptions of the strength of coordination and where improvements could be made. The survey should request feedback regarding private sector impressions of Power Africa's work in Senegal, suggestions for enhancement, and pertinent issues in the energy sector requiring improved USG coordination.

Currently, the perceived lack of effective communication and feedback mechanisms between the USG and private sector actors risks creating blind spots within *Power Africa*'s efforts in Senegal. Moreover, the nature of relationships with private sector entities in Senegal varies among USG agencies

operating under the *Power Africa* umbrella, leading to imbalances of pertinent knowledge and potentially hampering coordination efforts between agencies. To optimize the effectiveness of *Power Africa*, USG agencies must incorporate a wide array of input, equitably distribute information, and recognize information as a valuable currency. The private sector feedback survey could serve the dual purpose of both improving and streamlining relationships with the private sector as well as improving internal coordination if leveraged appropriately.

Drafting, regularly circulating, and subsequently analyzing surveys would likely require minimal time and resources all while efficiently incorporating information from external stakeholders to be shared across the *Power Africa* initiative. These efforts could be spearheaded and managed by the *Power Africa* Team Lead in conjunction with the Economics Section of the U.S. Embassy, as well as other relevant USG agencies in Senegal.

RECOMMENDATION #3: CREATE A HIGH-LEVEL ENERGY STRATEGY COMMITTEE

To underscore the importance and urgency of institutionalizing coordination, the U.S. Ambassador to Senegal should create a High-Level Energy Strategy Committee to facilitate coordination among USG agencies working on energy in Senegal. The Committee would incorporate and catalyze improvements in organizational function and internal and external communication, building on the two previous recommendations. The High-Level Energy Strategy Committee should serve as a convening mechanism to strategize ways to better coordinate among U.S. government actors in-country and facilitate energy policy implementation.

The Committee should convene on a biannual basis and be chaired by the Ambassador—either directly or represented by the Deputy Chief of Mission—to legitimize the Committee and elevate coordination under the *Power Africa* umbrella as a mission-wide priority.

Although designed primarily for internal U.S. government coordination purposes, the Strategy Committee should also extend occasional invitations to high-level representatives of the Senegalese government. Ideally, a GoSN representative should be present at the inaugural meeting of the Committee to further legitimize it and strengthen stakeholder incentives to participate. The Government of Senegal and other external stakeholders could provide information and perspectives on the energy sector in Senegal that would be invaluable to U.S. government agencies. Extending occasional invitations also provides the space for exploration of additional external collaborations.

Following from the organizational and communications challenges to the current coordination of *Power Africa* Senegal, the Energy Strategy Committee presents at least four strategic benefits:

- 1. Enhanced interagency coordination on energy developments relative to the status quo;
- 2. Increased agency-level incentives for collaboration given the Ambassador's leadership of the committee and periodic attendance of select external actors:
- 3. Increased unity of messaging and purpose within the U.S. government during interactions with GoSN and donor community representatives on energy affairs; and
- **4. Proactive preparation** ahead of *Power Africa* strategy meetings in Washington, D.C.

Drawing upon management literature, the High-Level Energy Strategy Committee in Senegal should be designed as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: High-Le	vel Energy Strategy Committee D	Design ¹²	
Component	Details		
	Composition should include USC	agencies and relevant GOSN actors:	
	USG Membership	GOSN Guest Membership	
	 Ambassador/DCM 	 Minister of Energy (or rep.) 	
	• ECON	 Senelec GM (or rep.) 	
Configuration	 USAID Mission Director 	 Senior Energy Policy Advisor 	
(Committee	• Power Africa Team Lead		
Membership)	• MCC		
	• OPIC		
	• USTDA		
	• U.S. Department of Treasury		
	Focus on high-level coordination	on and planning:	
	 Coordinate USG agencies' energy sector activities in-country 		
Responsibilities	 Identify potential risks and opportunities (in-country and regionally) 		
	 Assess progress toward Senegal's energy generation targets 		
	 Provide input to energy proje 	ect development where possible	
	Focus on agency updates and e flexible agendas allowing for:	energy sector developments, with	
	• Periodic review of USG strate	gy and message	
Agenda	 Joint strategy around project financing and implementation issues of shared concern 		
	 In-depth discussions of achievements to foster peer learning 		
	 Key unifying messages on pr 	iorities, challenges and strategy	
	Make decisions related to USG	agency collaboration:	
Decision Authority	 Determine key unifying mess strategy 	sages on priorities, challenges and	

28

Drawn from: Lechler, T. and Cohen, M. "Exploring the role of steering committees in realizing value from project management." Project Management Journal, 40(1), 42–54. 2009. https://www.pmi.org/learning/library/steering-committees-four-research-questions-5601.

The *Power Africa* Team Lead's Role on the Committee

The energy committee should not only leverage the power of the U.S. Ambassador, but also reinforce the authority of the *Power Africa* Team Lead to coordinate U.S. energy efforts in-country. The *Power Africa* Team Lead should be responsible for managing the agenda of the committee, in partnership with ECON, as well as any necessary follow up meetings for further coordination. Specifically, the *Power Africa* Team Lead should:

- Schedule biannual meetings in collaboration with ECON.
- Develop meeting agendas and draft/ compile read-ahead materials with relevant U.S. government agencies to incorporate agency-specific input and encourage active participation.
- Prepare the Ambassador for the meetings, including drafting talking points and other material needed for briefing books.
- Manage meeting invitations, readahead materials and any post-meeting taskers, on behalf of the Ambassador.
- Identify and invite key non-U.S. stakeholders on a per-meeting basis.
- Chair working-level interagency meetings prior to or after committee meetings to provide further opportunities for interagency collaboration;
- Manage dissemination of readouts from Committee meetings to assist in crafting a unified message.

In addition to leveraging the Ambassador and *Power Africa* Team Lead, the Energy Strategy Committee also provides a high-level platform to ensure the visibility and success of U.S. energy initiatives in Senegal.

It directly addresses the current costs of lack of coordination in Senegal among USG agencies outlined in this report. Biannual meetings will allow agencies to discuss ongoing projects and identify any areas of duplication as well as areas of possible collaboration. Project delays in Senegal could be discussed at committee meetings and a joint strategy can be created to move projects forward. Agencies could also share information on opportunities for further U.S. partnership and involvement to make sure that the United States is well positioned within Senegal's energy space. Lastly, the Committee meetings will help reinforce a unified message for U.S. involvement in Senegal's energy sector.



The Energy Strategy
Committee provides a
high-level platform to
ensure the visibility and
success of U.S. energy
initiatives in Senegal.

Power Africa Kenyan Case Study

Figure 3 describes relevant findings from *Power Africa* Kenya. While to date *Power Africa* Senegal has not implemented a committee to better coordinate interagency activities, the example of *Power Africa* Kenya provides precedent for the usefulness of this recommendation. The Kenya review solicited input from relevant U.S. government stakeholders as well as key Government of Kenya partners and multilateral donors, and recommended the creation of a "coordination function" to strengthen *Power Africa's* effectiveness in helping Kenya's power sector reach its generation, transmission, and distribution goals. The recommended High-Level Energy Strategy Committee described above for Senegal will serve the coordination function envisioned in the Kenyan case.

Figure 3: Lessons from Power Africa's Interventions in Kenya - A Case Study¹³

The *Power Africa* report entitled "Development of Kenya's Power Sector, 2015-2020" can serve as a reference point for the proposed High-Level Energy Strategy Committee within U.S. Embassy Dakar. In 2015, *Power Africa* Kenya began a review of the Kenyan energy sector to understand how it could best improve the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. The intervention strategies identified for *Power Africa* Kenya provide useful parallels that can be modified to enhance *Power Africa* coordination in Senegal.

The *Power Africa* review in Kenya found that effective coordination is facilitated by the clear articulation of value through: (1) on-the-ground support through country teams and transaction advisors; (2) a transaction focus with a database of projects that tracks progress and bottlenecks; (3) partnerships among a diverse network of public and private sector players; and (4) a toolbox from more than 120 partners to accelerate deal flow, leverage capital, and improve the enabling environment.

Further, the review emphasized improved understanding among stakeholders, better communication of *Power Africa*'s support to the power sector, and the need to highlight its accomplishments. Kenya's power sector is considered a success story in sub-Saharan Africa and has benefitted from strong leadership in government and robust collaboration with the private sector. *Power Africa* in Kenya has also modeled inclusivity and collaboration; it has engaged over 100 actors, among them a wide range of Kenyan government bodies, national utilities, independent power producers, off-grid actors, developers, investors, banks, end-users, and development partners. The report concluded with 11 distinct, actionable intervention strategies.

30

^{13 &}quot;Development of Kenya's Power Sector, 2015-2020." USAID. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Kenya_Power_Sector_report.pdf.

CONCLUSION

Improving coordination among *Power Africa* stakeholders is an urgent challenge. Addressing this issue has the potential to make a meaningful difference for Senegalese households, businesses, and communities by increasing the likelihood that universal electricity access is achieved by 2025. The country is fast approaching a critical juncture in its development journey and energy policy plays an essential role. In-country USG agencies thus have a distinct opportunity to leverage *Power Africa* and signal to GoSN counterparts their ability to contribute meaningfully to Senegal's long-term economic development.

The recommendations for improving coordination outlined in this report fall under three broad categories:

- I. Enhance Organizational Function by including *Power Africa* in the work requirements of all relevant USG stakeholders; enhancing the role of the *Power Africa* Team Lead; hiring a Senegalese *Power Africa* Locally Employed Staff (LES) whose primary assignment is to support the *Power Africa* portfolio in Senegal; and better integrating OPIC, the Department of Treasury, and the *Power Africa* Coordinator's Office.
- **II. Improve Internal and Leverage External Communication** by improving messaging regarding *Power Africa*'s objectives in Senegal. Internally, this would feature a biweekly *Power Africa*-wide internal newsletter highlighting agencies' activities. Externally, this would include leveraging high-level events to create a standardized toolkit for unified messaging, as well as using private sector feedback to improve internal coordination.
- **III.** Create a High-Level Energy Strategy Committee spearheaded by the U.S. Ambassador to Senegal and USAID Mission Director to further institutionalize coordination among U.S. government stakeholders in Senegal.

With the right combination of political will and commitment by all stakeholders, it is within *Power Africa*'s reach to address existing shortcomings. By institutionalizing the reforms outlined in this report, *Power Africa* Senegal can have a greater impact on the energy sector at this critical moment. Furthermore, tighter budgets across the U.S. government make it imperative to better utilize each agency's resources and reduce inefficiencies. By doing so, each agency will be a better steward of the U.S. tax-payer dollars dedicated to implementing the goals outlined in the Electrify Africa Act.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: MATRIX OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Category	Specific Recom- mendation	Summary of Recommendation	Implementation Responsibility
Enhance Organizational Function	Include Power Africa Coordination in Work Requirements for All Relevant USG Officers in Senegal	Including <i>Power Africa</i> coordination will incentivize and license relevant USG officers working on energy issues in Senegal to coordinate with each other. In particular, the <i>Power Africa</i> Team Lead and Economics Section officers should have coordination with each other on energy-related issues and travel in their work requirements.	Ambassador/DCM USAID Mission Director Other Relevant Agencies
	Enhance the Role of <i>Power Africa</i> Team Lead in Senegal	 The Power Africa Team Lead should: Design and implement a process of onboarding relevant USG officers; Increase communication within Power Africa Senegal; Manage the Power Africa Transaction Tracking Tool (PATT) for Senegal; and Better advertise transaction advisors 	Power Africa Team Lead
	Hire a Senegalese Power Africa Locally Employed Staff (LES)	Strategic benefits for the <i>Power Africa</i> team include: 1. Increased technical knowledge and expertise; 2. Enhanced access to local networks; 3. Increased institutional memory; and 4. Increased team capacity.	Power Africa Team Lead USAID Mission
	Better Connect OPIC	The Power Africa Team Lead should build a better relationship with OPIC, while managing expectations about the scope of potential involvement. OPIC's integration will reduce chances for missed opportunities in the Power Africa initiative, such as new energy projects, and help create unified messaging for the U.S. government.	Power Africa Team Lead OPIC
	Include Treasury	Strategic benefits include: 1. Improved coordination with multilaterals; 2. Increased potential for technical assistance; and 3. Increased expertise in reforms and investment environment.	Power Africa Team Lead Treasury

Category	Specific Recom- mendation	Summary of Recommendation	Implementation Responsibility
Enhance Organizational Function (continued)	Embed D.C. Power Africa Officer for Senegal in U.S. Embassy Dakar for 3 Months	 Strategic benefits include: Bridge coordination gaps between Power Africa officers in Dakar and Washington, D.C.; Strengthen relationships between key Power Africa staff in Senegal and Washington, D.C.; and Provide a better sense of which tasks fall under the purview of the Power Africa Team Lead and the Energy Office Deputy Director in Washington, D.C. 	Power Africa Coordinator's Office (D.C.) USAID Mission
lai	Send a Bi-Weekly Email and Monthly Newsletter to Enhance Inter- agency Information Sharing	 The Power Africa Team Lead should implement: 1. A bi-weekly email with topline updates on power initiatives; and 2. A comprehensive monthly newsletter with detailed updates. These will provide a forum for interaction with energy-related officers on an ongoing and predictable basis. 	Power Africa Team Lead
Improve Internal and Leverage External Communications	Encourage and Leverage Ambas- sador Participation in <i>Power Africa</i> Senegal Efforts	 The Power Africa Team Lead should: Regularly brief the Ambassador on Power Africa activities; Suggest Power Africa agenda items when energy-related meetings are scheduled for Ambassador; Actively suggest opportunities where the Ambassador can speak publicly about Power Africa; and Leverage the Ambassador's interest in Power Africa to coordinate a new Senegal-specific tool kit for use in communicating the initiative with external audiences. 	Ambassador/DCM Power Africa Team Lead
	Request and Leverage Private Sector Feedback Through a Biannual Survey	The survey should request private sector feedback regarding: 1. Impressions of <i>Power Africa</i> 's work in Senegal; 2. Suggestions for enhancement; and 3. Issues in the energy sector requiring improved USG coordination.	Power Africa Team Lead
Create a High-Level Energy Strategy Committee	Create a High-Level Energy Strategy Committee	Strategic Benefits of Committee: 1. Enhanced interagency coordination on energy developments; 2. Increased agency-level incentives for collaboration; 3. Increased unity of messaging; and 4. Proactive preparation ahead of <i>Power Africa</i> strategy meetings in Washington, D.C.	Ambassador/DCM USAID Mission Director Other Relevant Agencies

ANNEX II: USG STAKEHOLDER AND PARTNER DESCRIPTIONS

U.S. Government

USAID

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the main development agency of the United States whose mission is to "partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our [U.S.] security and prosperity."14 Power Africa is formally in the charge of USAID, which entails the existence of a specific budget. The Power Africa Coordinator sits in Pretoria, South Africa. In country, USAID missions are supported by a Power Africa Team Lead. In Senegal, USAID's Power Africa Team Lead is supported by five technical advisors contracted from Tetra Tech.

MCC

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a relatively small U.S. development agency that plays an outsized role in countries in which it invests. The agency seeks to reduce poverty through economic growth in low and middle-income countries with an annual budget of just \$900 million annually. When MCC invests in a country, it funnels hundreds of millions of dollars toward the constraints that hinder that country's economic growth over a span of just five years. Of the \$7 billion U.S. commitment to Power Africa, MCC has committed \$1.5 billion to the initiative through investment compacts in Malawi,

Liberia, Ghana, and Benin, as well as a power sector threshold program in Sierra Leone.15 MCC has been working with the Government of Senegal over the past two years to develop an energy compact that is expected to enter implementation in 2019. MCC currently has one staff member in Senegal, but that will increase when the compact enters into force.

OPIC

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is the U.S. government's development finance institution, whose mission is to mobilize private capital for development, advance U.S. foreign policy objectives, and support U.S. investors in emerging markets. With instruments including direct loans, loan guarantees, political risk insurance, and private equity funds, OPIC had a portfolio of approximately \$21.5 billion in 2016 and regularly returns a net profit to the U.S. Treasury. OPIC is limited by a cap on its portfolio (\$29 billion) and cannot issue equity or fund technical assistance.16 However, the agency brings considerable financial impact to the Power Africa initiative. Between 2013 and 2016, OPIC committed over \$2 billion to power projects in sub-Saharan Africa. To date, OPIC has financed the Contour-Global Cap des Biches power plant and Taiba N'Diaye wind farm in Senegal, comprising direct finance of approximately \$277 million (excluding guarantees).17 OPIC does not have a

¹⁴ Mission, Vision and Values. U.S. Agency for International Development, May 3, 2017. https://www.usaid.gov/ who-we-are/mission-vision-values.

^{15 &}quot;MCC and Power Africa." Millennium Challenge Corporation. https://www.mcc.gov/initiatives/initiative/ power-africa.

^{16 &}quot;Foreign Assistance Agency Brief." Center for Global Development. April 11, 2017. https://www.cqdev.org/ publication/foreign-assistance-agency-brief-overseas-private-investment-corporation-opic.

^{17 &}quot;Active OPIC Projects." OPIC: Overseas Private Investment Corporation. https://www.opic.gov/opic-action/ active-opic-projects.

presence in Senegal, but recently has opened a West Africa office with one staff member in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.

Department of State

The Department of State promotes U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad, aiming to "shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just and democratic world."18 Its operating budget was \$50.1 billion in 2016, though the Trump Administration has suggested sharp cuts of nearly 25 percent for 2018. Within the Power Africa initiative, State provides technical assistance and promotes regulatory reforms to increase private investment in the African energy sector. In practice, State serves as the advocate for the U.S. business community to African governments—a role complementing other agencies focused on promoting American business interests, such as OPIC. In Senegal, the Economics (ECON) Section of the U.S. Embassy fosters high-level contacts within the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the President's office and elsewhere. This knowledge of in-country dynamics is critical to connecting the private sector to government officials to whom they otherwise would not have access.

USTDA

The United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) is an independent agency of the U.S government with a mission to further economic development and U.S. commercial interests in developing and middle-income countries. With an annual budget of \$60 million (FY 2016), it helps companies create U.S. jobs through the export of U.S. goods and services for development projects aimed at emerging economies, connecting U.S.

businesses with export opportunities. USTDA's main strength is its ability to prepare bankable projects through a toolkit including feasibility studies, technical assistance, piloting of U.S. technology and equipment overseas, and project preparation assistance. Within Power Africa Senegal, USTDA takes the lead in investing in project preparation activities. It provides essential early-stage planning for new power generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure, with special expertise in feasibility studies. Though active in Senegal, USTDA's manager for the West African region is based in Ghana, with most supporting staff in Washington, D.C.

Export-Import Bank

The mission of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) is to "aid in financing and to facilitate exports of goods and services, imports, and the exchange of commodities and services between the United States ... and any foreign country or the agencies or nationals of any such country ... [in order] to contribute to the employment of United States workers" (emphasis added).19 Like OPIC, EXIM is a self-sustaining entity, but it currently cannot make investments greater than \$10 million because it does not have a chairman and full board. The agency also requires congressional approval to reauthorize, which was recently delayed and thus shut down new lending. In the context of Power Africa, EXIM is responsible for \$5 billion of the \$7 billion promised by the Obama Administration, though the agency has authorized just \$131.6 million for power sector transactions in nine projects across sub-Saharan Africa.²⁰ EXIM contributes to power projects

^{18 &}quot;Our Mission, Values, and History." U.S. Department of State. November 17, 2014. http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2014/html/235023.htm.

^{19 &}quot;The Charter of the Export-Import Bank of the United States." EXIM US (Export-Import Bank of the United States), February 25, 2016. https://www.exim.gov/sites/default/files/newsreleases/EXIM%20Bank%20Charter%20-%20as%20amended%20by%20the%20Reauthorization%20Act%20of%202015.pdf.

^{20 &}quot;Power Africa: A 2017 Update." U.S. Agency for International Development. December 4, 2017. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/dec-4-2017-fact-sheet-power-africa-2017-update.

based on demand; it does not actively seek to contribute to the *Power Africa* portfolio. EXIM currently does not have a *Power Africa* footprint in Senegal.

Department of Treasury

The Department of the Treasury focuses on macroeconomic frameworks and policies supporting development. The Office of International Affairs represents the U.S. at the international financial institutions (IFIs), provides technical assistance to foreign governments, and negotiates debt relief. The agency's goal in working with the IFIs and foreign governments is to unlock broad economic growth through improving institutional frameworks and debt management, with the energy sector in sub-Saharan Africa a secondary but necessary consideration. With a Power Africa coordinator and a sub-Saharan Africa country desk, Treasury has provided an important macroeconomic perspective to the other agencies. However, while a technical assistance program to support the energy sector in Africa has been considered, the agency has yet to directly engage on a country basis with the initiative, including in Senegal.

Government of Senegal

Ministry of Petroleum and Energy

The newly created Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is the chief body charged with formulating, implementing, and coordinating energy policy in Senegal. Specifically, the Ministry implements energy policy—as defined by the president—related to the production, distribution and promotion of energy

resources.²¹ The management of oil and gas operations as well as operations in renewable energy both fall under the purview of the Ministry. Within the Ministry sits the Planning and Studies Bureau, which conducts all economical and feasibility studies required for any energy sector project. In this capacity, the Planning and Studies Bureau provides relevant data, while coordinating donor relations. The Bureau is currently leading studies on thermal electrification with Senelec and tariff harmonization, and has also supported Senelec, the national electricity company, in developing a master plan for energy transmission. In the Power Africa context, USAID provides technical assistance supporting the conduct of such studies.

Senelec

Senelec is the state-owned electricity company in Senegal playing a leading role in the electricity sub-sector. It holds concessions for the generation, transportation and distribution of electricity in the country.²² Senelec owns approximately 50% of generation capacity, while the remaining half is owned by Independent Power Producers (IPPs).²³ All electricity generated by IPPs is sold directly and exclusively to Senelec,²⁴ responsible for transporting electricity to end users. In addition to the aforementioned, Senelec works on identifying and financing "new works" in the electricity space.²⁵ Power Africa supports the national utility company with capacity building, specifically toward the modernization of the utility and the integration of renewable energy sources into the energy mix.²⁶ The United States, namely through MCC, is

24 Ibid.

36

^{21 &}quot;Missions Du Ministère." Ministère Du Pétrole et Des Énergies. 2015. http://www.energie.gouv.sn/content/missions-du-minist%C3%A8re.

^{22 &}quot;Senelec Experience in IPPs." Senelec. June 23, 2016. http://www.energynet.co.uk/webfm_send/1614.

^{23 &}quot;Additional Financing To The Electricity Sector Support Project." World Bank. July 7, 2016. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/593131470244330855/pdf/PAD1815-PJPR-P158655-OUO-9-IDA-R2016-0184-1.pdf.

^{25 &}quot;Cadre Institutionnel." Senelec. 2018. http://www.senelec.sn/content/view/13/50/.

^{26 &}quot;Senegal Power Africa Fact Sheet." U.S. Agency for International Development Senegal. February 24, 2017. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/SenegalCountryFactSheet.2016.09_FINAL.pdf.

supporting the Government of Senegal in its plans to make this transition.

Commission de Régulation du Secteur de d'Electricité (CRSE)

The CRSE is the designated body in charge of the overall regulation of the electricity sector in Senegal. It has a wide range of responsibilities including but not limited to: investigating and awarding licenses, configuring tariffs, ensuring compliance with technical standards, and managing the IPP tender process.27 CRSE also oversees all electricity sales and is responsible for imposing penalties on operators in the event of breaches of contractual obligations. Creating an enabling environment to attract private investments in the energy sector is a core component of the Power Africa model, and CRSE is a key player on this front.

Agence Sénégalaise d'Électrification Rurale (ASER)

The Senegalese Rural Electrification Agency was founded in 2000 and charged with expanding electricity access in rural households and areas. ASER has electrified more than 1,000 villages using grid extensions, solar home systems, and isolated mini-grids connected to diesel generators. The agency has also provided concessions for rural areas to private investors under the Rural Electrification Priority Program.²⁸

Private Sector

The private sector consists of a group of critical stakeholders in Senegal's energy land-scape. Private actors play many different roles

at different points in the energy generation and transmission life cycle. These range from exploring for oil and gas, such as Kosmos Energy,²⁹ to providing infrastructure financing, operating independent power plants, and managing utilities. For example, Lekela is a private renewable energy generation company working in Senegal's energy sector that develops, owns, and operates utility-scale wind and power plants³⁰ like the Taiba N'Diaye wind plant.

Multilateral Institutions and Other Donors

The World Bank Group plays a financier, policy advisor, and capacity building role within Senegal's energy sector. Specifically, it collaborates on scaling up the use of off-grid and small-scale technologies, supporting geothermal power development, and strengthening regional power trade. More recently, it has increasingly focused on IPP projects. The World Bank currently has four ongoing energy projects totaling around \$400 million. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) has been a large player and has directly contributed towards 40% of Senegal's current energy generating capacity. Main projects are Tobene Independent Power Producer, Cap des Biches project and Comesal Luga, a Greenfield project in rural electrification. The World Bank Group mostly interacts with Power Africa's transaction advisors.

The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) joined the *Power Africa* initiative as a multilateral development partner in July 2013. Officially, AfDB is an "anchor" partner, with a \$3 billion commitment toward energy projects

^{27 &}quot;Nos Missions." CRSE. http://www.crse.sn/nos-missions.

^{28 &}quot;Combined Project Information Documents." World Bank. July 19, 2016. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/357801469047080849/pdf/PIDISDS-CON-Print-P158709-07-20-2016-1469047076294.pdf.

^{29 &}quot;Kosmos Energy: Africa, South America Oil & Gas Exploration, Production." Kosmos Energy. http://www.kosmosenergy.com/.

^{30 &}quot;Lekela Power." Lekela Power. http://lekela.com/.

over five years.³¹ Under this commitment, AfDB supports a variety of projects related but not limited to energy production, transmission, distribution infrastructure, and policy reforms. Within Senegal's energy sector, the AfDB led the financing of the Sendou power project, a 125MW coal-fired plant that will generate electricity to be integrated into the country's national grid.³²

Several donor countries are supporting the Senegalese energy sector, including, but not limited to: the French Development Agency (AFD), the European Union (EU), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the German Development Bank (KfW). The extent to which each of these donors engage with the Senegalese Government is quite varied, relating to each country's political and historical relations, thematic concerns in their development work, and technical expertise. Donors are actively promoting the energy sector by offering sovereign and non-sovereign loans for energy projects, strengthening regulatory and institutional frameworks, supporting governance, and providing other technical assistance.

^{31 &}quot;Power Africa Initiative." African Development Bank. https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/power-africa-initiative/energy-power/.

^{32 &}quot;Sendou Coal Power Project." African Development Bank. https://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/project-portfolio/p-sn-f00-004/.

ANNEX III: ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations fall under a category of common solutions to interagency coordination challenges and were also raised in discussions with USG interagency partners as well as external stakeholders. Though they are not among the primary recommendations described above, they merited consideration. Ultimately, while each recommendation has associated benefits, these are outweighed by several factors, including lack of clear enforcement mechanisms, substantial time commitments, divergent preferences, and lack of incentive among relevant stakeholders.

Introduce a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Within Power Africa Senegal

An MOU within U.S. Embassy Dakar—administered from the top-down-could ensure better coordination by explicitly mandating that USG agencies work together on projects in the energy sector in Senegal. This could increase the likelihood that agencies engage proactively, as well as provide clearly articulated parameters for coordination. At a minimum, an MOU would more clearly delineate roles and responsibilities within Power Africa Senegal and facilitate continuous coordination when relevant staff enter and exit Senegal. Additionally, to increase effectiveness, agencies could choose to enter into more granular agreements with their counterparts. For example, an MOU could be crafted expressly between the USAID Mission and MCC to focus on improving coordination during the design phase of the MCC compact.

However, concerns regarding the timeline of its rollout and implementation significantly undermine the viability of the MOU

as an effective option. The lack of a clear and reliable enforcement mechanism presents further complication. The likelihood of a large time commitment to negotiate an MOU with potentially limited efficacy and unpredictable results also presents a considerable risk. An additional risk is the possibility of tensions between actors in the process of negotiation or implementation; indeed, the agencies' divergent preferences or lack of clarity around the written parameters might pose a challenge and ultimately undermine the MOU as a mechanism to increase coordination. Finally, the MOU might also be viewed as an unnecessary redundancy given the implicit expectation that USG agencies should coordinate to implement Power Africa even in the absence of a formal document.

Utilize Office of the *Power*Africa Coordinator to Improve Coordination in Senegal

Some Power Africa agency stakeholders in Senegal believe the Office of the Coordinator in Washington, D.C. (and Pretoria, South Africa) could play a more important role improving in-country coordination. Currently, the Deputy Energy Office Director in Washington is responsible for overseeing Power Africa projects in Senegal, as well as Côte d'Ivoire. To improve communication between Washington and Senegal, and within the embassy, the Coordinator's Office could hold a regular teleconference with all agencies in Dakar to share information about Power Africa-related activities. This would give the Coordinator's Office a better sense of how agencies cooperate on the ground, and also require agencies to communicate in advance

of regular meetings with headquarters. On the ground, this could improve information flow, as each agency would be more aware of its counterparts' activities.

Though additional involvement by the Power Africa Coordinator's Office in Washington, D.C. could improve coordination between the Embassy and the Washington, D.C. office, it was not selected as a primary recommendation. Distance would likely make effective coordination more rather than less difficult. And without a high-level convener, such as the Ambassador, stakeholders may not see an incentive to put in the work needed for effective communication. Power Africa stakeholders already have limited time to commit to additional meetings. As a result, the High-Level Energy Strategy Committee recommended above is a more efficient use of time and energy to address the challenge of ineffective coordination among U.S. government Power Africa stakeholders.



ANNEX IV: ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Jacob Cruz

Jacob grew up in Los Angeles. He attended the University of Southern California, where he completed bachelor's degrees in neuroscience and international relations. Following graduation, Jacob spent half a decade crossing six continents overland and working in capacities ranging from freelance writing to medical research. He then attended the University of California San Diego School of Medicine. After deciding to leave medicine, he worked in the development department of the International Center for Transitional Justice and as a consultant with CS Space. While a M.P.A. candidate at Princeton University, he has interned with Impacto Social Consultores in Mexico City.

Amber Forbes

Amber is a Civil Service employee in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, currently a second-year MPA student at the Woodrow Wilson School. During her seven-year tenure in the Bureau, Amber has served in both public affairs and economic development roles. Prior to the 2015 Summit of the Americas, she led an interagency working group on social development comprising 13 U.S. agencies. Amber completed a six-month rotation as a Program Officer at the Millennium Challenge Corporation where she managed the \$277 million El Salvador Investment Compact. Following her first year at Princeton, Amber completed a summer internship at the Inter-American Foundation focused on the relationship between migration and development in Central America. Amber has a bachelor's degree from the University of Michigan where she double majored in political science

and Latin American and Caribbean studies.

Eva Ghirmai

Eva is a second-year MPA student at the Woodrow Wilson School, studying economics and public policy. Before this program, she worked in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa on international development research. Her primary focus has been in impact assessments, where she previously worked with IDinsight and the International Growth Centre (IGC) to help organizations and governments use research and data analysis more generally to make policy decisions. This past summer, she interned at the African Development Bank (AfDB), where she worked with the Private Sector, Infrastructure, and Industrialization team on Bank strategies.

Zehra Ijaz

Born and raised in Karachi, Pakistan, Zehra holds a Bachelor's Degree in English from Yale University and an MBA from INSEAD. Her professional background is in global health and international development. Prior to coming to Princeton Zehra worked at John Snow, Inc. (JSI), a public health consulting firm, managing health projects in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Her projects were funded by a variety of international donors including USAID, the Gates Foundation, and UNICEF, and focused on issues ranging from HIV/AIDS to family planning. She has also spent time at the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) in New York and studied sexual and reproductive health in Pakistan and Southern Africa.

Albert Pak

Albert is currently pursuing an MPA/J.D. with Penn Law and WWS. Before graduate school, he worked as a management consultant for Oliver Wyman, where he specialized in the financial services industry. He then went on to help launch 12+, an education nonprofit that creates college-going cultures in Philadelphia high schools. As COO, Albert played an integral role in expanding 12+'s reach from one hundred to over a thousand students. During that time, he also started the Ivy Advantage Academy, a test prep social enterprise that pursues a "double bottom line." Albert plans on combining his experience in business, law, and policy to tackle systemic issues in urban communities. This past summer, he worked in the Community Investment and Activation team at Rock Ventures in the great city of Detroit. Albert is a magna cum laude graduate of the Wharton School and the College of Arts and Sciences at Penn.

Qazi Rashid

Qazi Rashid is a second year MPA student at the Wilson School studying Economics and Public Policy. Prior to Princeton, he worked at several social startups focusing on development finance, financial inclusion, fintech, and social entrepreneurship. Qazi worked intimately with tier 1 financial institutions in the Middle East and North Africa region providing data-driven financial and product development advisory services. Qazi also provided programmatic support by managing Narwi's operation (Kiva for Arab youth); designing feasibility studies; monitoring and evaluating loans; and writing proposals for greenfielding MFIs. He worked with two fintech startups focusing on Islamic finance and social entrepreneurship. Qazi co-founded an advisory firm that provides bespoke research support to socially conscious entities. While an undergrad at Georgetown, Qazi worked as a researcher at Qatar National Research Fund, evaluating the impact of financial literacy on financial behavior of low-income migrant workers. Qazi was born and raised in a small village in Chittagong, Bangladesh.

Richard Sambasivam

Richard Sambasivam is from Southern California and graduated from UCLA in 2014. He spent two years in the Money Markets section of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, where he worked on the normalization of short term interest rates, the Fed's \$4.5 trillion balance sheet, and the Treasury's cash needs during the 2015 debt limit episode. This past summer Richard worked for the U.S. director at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, reviewing projects and bank strategy for financial viability, sound development, and support of U.S. interests. Richard's goal after obtaining a master's degree is to help the United States and multilateral institutions use economic and financial tools to more effectively create stability and improve livelihoods around the world.

Martin De Simone

Martín was born and raised in Avellaneda, a city in the south of Buenos Aires, Argentina. He holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science from Universidad de San Andrés, where he was granted a full scholarship and he graduated summa cum laude. Since 2012, he has worked in different areas of the federal government of his country. He started researching on policy evaluation at the National Institute of Public Administration (INAP) of Argentina, part of the Head of the Cabinet of Ministers. He served for three years at the Federal Ministry of Security of Argentina. In 2016, he was appointed as Director of Articulation Between the Security and the Education Systems. He did research about organized crime and citizen security policies for several civil society organizations, and he writes for different national mass media. He spent the summer in Amsterdam, where he worked at the Transnational Institute, doing research on the intersections between violence and development and doing advocacy to propose a violence reduction strategy in Latin American cities through

alternative development approaches. Martín is particularly interested in topics of poverty, development, fragility, and public safety.

Anna Twum

Anna grew up in Accra, Ghana and studied economics at Pomona College. After college, she moved to Washington D.C and took up a position at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a research analyst. Her work at the International Monetary fund was focused on macroeconomic capacity development. Outside of the IMF, she was involved in African youth advocacy. These two experiences resulted in an interest in economic and policy research geared specifically towards African youth. She is also interested in the intersection of socio-economic development and artificial intelligence policy. She spent summer 2017 at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Rwanda office, where she mainly worked on industrialization policy in Uganda.

James Ladi Williams

Born and raised in Lagos, Nigeria, Ladi moved to New York City in 2011 for undergraduate studies at John Jay College of Criminal Justice (CUNY), where he studied Public Administration with a minor in Economics. After graduation, he served as a NYC Urban fellow at NYC Opportunity, a unit within the New York City Mayor's Office that designs, implements, and evaluates innovative, evidence-based programs tackling poverty. At NYC Opportunity, Ladi worked on subsidized jobs programs for young adults facing barriers to employment and educational opportunities. Ladi recently completed a summer internship in Freetown, Sierra Leone, where he supported the executive management team at Rising Academy Network on projects related to education access and systems design. After graduate school, he plans to confront the social development challenges in his hometown, and to assist governments in

becoming more intentional in their responses to poverty.

Lauryn Williams

Lauryn was born and raised in Long Beach, California. She graduated from Stanford with a B.A. in political science and honors in international security studies. Lauryn developed an interest in nuclear issues as an undergraduate and continued in this policy area after receiving a Junior Fellowship from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Following the one-year fellowship with the Nuclear Policy Program, Lauryn remained at Carnegie as a project manager. Over this twoyear period, she researched various topics, travelled internationally, and published a report and multiple editorials. In the summer of 2017, Lauryn worked on countering weapons of mass destruction policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon. She focused on global health security, Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and upcoming nuclear policy reviews.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "ADS Chapter 436: Foreign Service Assignments and Tours of Duty." United States Agency for International Development. December 22, 2016. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/1877/436.pdf.
- "Active OPIC Projects." OPIC: Overseas Private Investment Corporation. https://www.opic.gov/ opic-action/active-opic-projects.
- "Additional Financing To The Electricity Sector Support Project." World Bank. July 7, 2016. http:// documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/593131470244330855/pdf/PAD1815-PJPR-P158655-OUO-9-IDA-R2016-0184-1.pdf.
- "Cadre Institutionnel." Senelec. 2018. http://www.senelec.sn/content/view/13/50/.
- "Combined Project Information Documents." World Bank. July 19, 2016. http:// documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/357801469047080849/pdf/PIDISDS-CON-Prin t-P158709-07-20-2016-1469047076294.pdf.
- "Development of Kenya's Power Sector, 2015-2020." USAID. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/1860/Kenya_Power_Sector_report.pdf.
- "Energy For All: Financing Access for the Poor." International Energy Agency. 2011. www. worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2011/weo2011_energy_for_all.pdf.
- "Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Senegal." U.S. Department of State. June 30, 2017. http://www. state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2862.htm.
- "Foreign Assistance Agency Brief." Center for Global Development. April 11, 2017. https://www. cgdev.org/publication/foreign-assistance-agency-brief-overseas-private-investmentcorporation-opic.
- "How We Work." U.S. Agency for International Development. December 9, 2016. https://www. usaid.gov/powerafrica/howwework.
- "Kosmos Energy: Africa, South America Oil & Gas Exploration, Production." Kosmos Energy. http://www.kosmosenergy.com/.
- Lechler, T. and Cohen, M. "Exploring the role of steering committees in realizing value from project management." Project Management Journal, 40(1), 42-54. 2009. https://www.pmi. org/learning/library/steering-committees-four-research-questions-5601.
- "Lekela Power." Lekela Power. http://lekela.com/.

- "MCC and Power Africa." Millennium Challenge Corporation. https://www.mcc.gov/initiatives/initiative/power-africa.
- "Missions Du Ministère." Ministère Du Pétrole et Des Énergies. 2015. http://www.energie.gouv.sn/content/missions-du-minist%C3%A8re.
- "Nos Missions." CRSE. http://www.crse.sn/nos-missions.
- "Our Mission, Values, and History." U.S. Department of State. November 17, 2014. http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2014/html/235023.htm.
- "Power Africa: A 2017 Update." U.S. Agency for International Development. December 4, 2017. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/dec-4-2017-fact-sheet-power-africa-2017-update.
- "Power Africa Initiative." African Development Bank. https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/power-africa-initiative/energy-power/.
- "Power Africa in Senegal." U.S. Agency for International Development. February 24, 2017. https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/senegal.
- "Power Africa Roadmap 2017." U.S. Agency for International Development. https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/roadmap.
- "The Roadmap." U.S. Agency for International Development. April 20a6 https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/USAID_PA_Roadmap_April_2016_TAG_508opt.pdf
- "Sendou Coal Power Project." African Development Bank. https://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/project-portfolio/p-sn-f00-004/.
- "Senegal Power Africa Fact Sheet." U.S. Agency for International Development Senegal. February 24, 2017. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/SenegalCountryFactSheet.2016.09_FINAL.pdf.
- "Senegal." Lighting Africa. https://www.lightingafrica.org/country/senegal/.
- "Senelec Experience in IPPs." Senelec. June 23, 2016. http://www.energynet.co.uk/webfm_send/1614.
- "The Charter of the Export-Import Bank of the United States." EXIM US (Export-Import Bank of the United States), February 25, 2016. https://www.exim.gov/sites/default/files/newsreleases/EXIM%20Bank%20Charter%20-%20as%20amended%20by%20the%20Reauthorization%20Act%20of%202015.pdf.
- "U.S. Government Agencies Power Africa." United States Agency for International Development. 24 February 17. https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/usgovernmentagencies.





PRINCETON UNIVERSITY