The U.S.-China Summit in May created an opening for renewed dialogue around a host of issues that matter to both nations. Princeton School of Public and International Affairs students traveled to Beijing shortly after the meetings between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. They found policymakers, academics, and students more willing to discuss political and policy differences, including trade and the question of Taiwan, on the heels of the summit.
Rory Truex, an associate professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton SPIA, studies Chinese politics and theories of authoritarian rule. In this interview, he explains the significance of the Trump-Xi Summit and how the U.S.-China relationship is likely to evolve from here.
Was the Trump-Xi Summit a significant moment in U.S.-China relations and, if so, what did it achieve?
Rory Truex: The summit was significant in that it happened and therefore may signal some raising of the floor of U.S.-China relations. Both sides seem to have realized the limits of their power and the ability of the other to inflict economic damage. President Trump has signaled that he would like a more productive relationship with China and has referred to Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a friend. This statement alone shifts the Overton window of the China discussion in Washington, putting the president somewhat out of sync from his own party.
What policy issues are likely to see progress as a result of the meeting?
RT: The meeting was short on concrete deliverables, but we may see more efforts at dialogue emerge in the months and years to come. The Chinese side has put forth the concept of “constructive strategic stability” to guide the nature of the relationship, which acknowledges the broader environment of competition but aims to regularize diplomacy and make the relationship more predictable. This may yield longer-term progress on thorny issues like trade and even transnational problems like artificial intelligence [AI] regulation.
What does Xi's subsequent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin signal about U.S.-China relations in this moment?
RT: This meeting, timed shortly after the Trump-Xi summit, shows that China is unwilling to sacrifice its relationships in the interest of building stronger ties to the United States. The [subsequent] meeting between Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin was noticeably warmer and less stilted, and Xi likely views Russia as a more reliable long-term partner.
What areas of difference remain between U.S. and China? Is there potential for alignment in other areas despite them?
RT: There remain huge areas of difference in the U.S.-China relationship, and the summit did little to address most of them. On the U.S. side, there remain significant concerns about China’s posturing over Taiwan, its relationship with Russia, government intervention in key sectors like renewable energy and electric vehicles, cyber-espionage, and human rights abuses, to name a few. The Chinese side likely feels squeezed by American economic pressure and is irked by tariffs and export controls on semiconductors and other sensitive technologies. Most of these differences will remain for the foreseeable future, but there are transnational issues where the countries’ interests do align. It would be nice to see the two governments focus more of their collective energies on climate change, public health, global poverty, and AI regulation, but the globalist agenda doesn’t hold much purchase in either capital right now.
Where do you expect the U.S.-China relationship to go from here?
RT: I expect more of the same for the time that Trump and Xi are in power. There will be periodic summits, and some minor progress on trade issues. I do not see a war in the near future or even a renewed trade war. The AI race, to the extent that it continues, will play an even greater role in the discourse, and there is a significant strategic question facing both sides. Do both governments continue to pursue artificial general intelligence at full speed, with the attendant risks? Or do they agree to decelerate or even pause, using that time to address the alignment problem and managing economic disruption?
