In an era marked by rapid technological innovation and intensifying competition over global dominance, the Program on Science and Global Security (SGS) at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs has received a $500,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York to investigate how the pursuit and deployment of emerging technologies for military advantage may reshape nuclear war risks and how global diplomacy could address the related security challenges.

The two-year grant will support SGS’s efforts to provide independent, science-based analysis of technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum engineering, and space-based surveillance systems — tools increasingly entwined with a race to develop capabilities potentially able to neutralize adversaries’ nuclear arsenals. The funding builds on a decades-long relationship between SGS and Carnegie Corporation, dating back to the 1980s.

“We wanted to do scientific, technical, and policy research that unpacks where these technologies are in terms of the laboratory and in military planning and ambitions, and what that would mean for what these technologies actually could do as part of foreseeable military systems and plans in the real world,” said Zia Mian, co-director of SGS.

The timing of this work is critical. Mian described the current geopolitical climate as a “period of hegemonic competition,” particularly between the United States and China, where technological dominance is increasingly seen as a pathway to global primacy.

Mian warned against “technological determinism,” the belief that technology alone will dictate strategic outcomes. SGS’s research will test this assumption — commonly embedded in policy, military, and corporate narratives — by offering impartial assessments of what these technologies can realistically achieve. This is especially vital as policymakers increasingly rely on speculative capabilities to justify defense spending and strategic postures.

SGS Co-Director Alexander Glaser, a professor in the School of Public and International Affairs and in the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, noted, “We see little evidence so far for actual changes in existing nuclear strategies by any nuclear-armed state that can be attributed to emerging technologies, despite all the talk. We see mostly a focus on newer versions of old military platforms, and many claims of futuristic technologies that may be possible someday.”

SGS has assembled an international team of technical experts for this project, including partners from the University of Hamburg, the University of Wisconsin, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Many of these experts were part of a two-day workshop organized by SGS in 2023 to assess the implications of emerging technologies on the futures of nuclear weapon policies in the United States, Russia, and China.

SGS will also partner with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs on the research. The collaboration will allow SGS and the research team to examine global governance challenges and explore cooperative solutions to prevent a runaway arms race. “As emerging technologies accelerate, their potential integration into nuclear weapons systems could transform existing risks into existential ones,” said Beyza Unal and Chris King of the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs. “Without transparency, human control, and robust norms and rules, misperception and miscalculation can lead to unintended escalation, with consequences not only for states but also for humanity itself.”

“Technology is now indisputably connected to global and national security,” Mian said. “University-based research programs like ours can contribute by offering technically sound, independent analysis — so that democratic societies can make informed decisions, not just rely on military claims or corporate promises. We also want to see what we can suggest to the U.N. and international community about getting a handle on these technologies.”